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Book Reviews
NEITHER PURSE NOR SWORD. By JAMES
THE MACMILLAN

M.

BECK AND MERLE THORPE. NEW YORK:

CO., 1936. pp. xiii, 210.

This volume is by James M. Beck (who died as the manuscript was nearing
completion), the great contributor to the study of American government, and particularly the Constitution of the United States, and Merle Thorpe, editor of Nation's
Business.
Chapter headings are: Government Adrift; Lost Objectives of the Constitution;
The Dissolving Union; Property Rights and the Right to Property; The Law of
the People; The Tap Root of Democracy; The Balance Wheel of the Union; The
Economic Basis of the Constitution; Economic Freedom and Political Control;
Economic and Political Centralism; Expanding Government; Paying the Bills of
Government, and Neither Purse nor Sword.
The motivating causes which led to the establishment of the "Union," and the
extraordinary success the government of the Union had attained under the Constitution at the close of the first century of its history, because the "ethos" of the
people, their intelligence and political consciousness, generated a will and attitude
of mind to adhere to the Constitution which established a government of law and
not of men, are all briefly and clearly developed in the first chapter. But the shock
of the World War tore government loose from its moorings. Government is adrift.
The war did not make the world safe for democracy. No social institution has suffered more than democracy in the years that have followed that conflict.
In such periods of stress, attendant upon and following major conflicts, and
particularly the economic depression of the past few years, the disposition is to alter
forms of government on the ground that they are in themselves inadequate. The
political question is always whether the people shall chart the course of government, or whether the government shall mold the lives of the people to its ends. If
the latter, then constitutional democracy passes off the stage and autocracy takes
its bow in the guise of a benevolent paternalism. Government by law, enacted
by an independent legislative body, gives way to the caprice of the executive, and
thus is epitomized the success of the ever-present centripetal tendency in government (the tendency to centralize) and the failure of the centrifugal tendency (the
tendency to localize). And thus is accomplished the tragedy of failure, for a form
of government arises from powers granted to the central authority, all not so granted
being retained in the people. The only restraint not yet completely removed is the
restraint which may be exercised by the third and co-ordinate branch of government, the judiciary. The authors say in this connection:
"If the people conceive their government to be a federated republic
of limited powers-as they once did-it will remain so. If their imagination
portrays it as a unitary socialistic state, it will become so, and no written
constitution can prevent it. The Roman Republic lasted as long as the
(87)
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people willed to maintain it. When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, his act was
in itself an event of no great importance. Its significance lay in the fact
that it was a violation of a constitutional principle. When that violation was
condoned, the end of the Roman Republic was foreshadowed. Similarly,
when his great nephew, Augustus,--a smiling, affable, kindly and wellmeaning man,--induced the Roman Senate, in a period of great depression,
to yield to him its powers for a period of ten years, the Senate never
regained them and Augustus and his successors every ten years celebrated
the renewal of the concentration of power in one man with a sardonic
ceremonial. When the Senate thus delegated its legislative power, the
Republic ceased to be."'
The authors raise the question of whether the American people are now treading
this path in the matter of constitutionalism.
In its short compass, the volume accurately puts historical facts and motivations resulting in the establishment of our form of government, its progress, the
veneration generated for it, and then labels the historical incidents, all within
the memory of middle-aged persons now living, from which its downfall may be
dated, unless the American people still retain sufficient of that very uncommon
thing ordinarily referred to as fundamental common sense, which, when properly
concentrated and made articulate, will serve as an adequate brake.
The "tap root of democracy" is in the people. The word "democracy" is susceptible of many meanings. As a social ideal, it means simply equality of opportunity, freedom from unfair privilege. As applied to political government, it has
a different meaning. Derivatively it means the rule of the people, but practically
that means the rule of the majority. The authors state that it is manifest that the
men who framed the American Constitution were not unqualified democrats. They
did not believe in oligarchy, the rule of the few, nor did they believe under all circumstances in the rule of the majority, which is democracy. They recognized that
there were matters which required a collective judgment, as to which the only
practicable rule was to accept the will of the majority, in view of the fact that
unanimity was out of the question. In this restricted sense, they accepted democracy,
not because they believed that any government could be wisely conducted by the
massed ignorance of the people
"but wholly from the utilitarian consideration of the obvious necessity
that these restricted activities must be the subject of a law, and that it
to accept the opinion of a
was more conducive to peaceful relations
2
majority, rather than of a minority."
But beyond this restricted field there was and is a large sphere of power in which
the Convention which framed the Constitution refused to accept the will of the
majority.
"It believed that the individual, even though he were 'Athanasius
against the world,' had rights against which even the views of the majority
should not prevail; that a man, by virtue of his God-given attributes as a
1. P. 9.
2. P. 82.
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human soul, had rights which could not be justly invaded by the State. To
these reserved rights of the individual they declined to apply the principle
to preserve what was to them the nobler principle
of democracy, preferring
3
of individualism."
And thus the Constitution is an expression of individualism. But, as the authors
have it, the Jeffersonian interpretation of democracy which took root in a decade
after the Constitution was adopted, when Thomas Jefferson came into power, has
completely dominated the minds of succeeding generations and is "consciously or
unconsciously the doctrine of America today." And the cardinal doctrine of the
Jeffersonian political philosophy was the rule of the majority, as the one sure guardian of the rights of man. But the framers of the Constitution put a great curb
on unlimited democracy by writing into the fundamental law a Bill of Rights, by
which the framers of the Constitution refused "to put upon the brow of the people
the crown that they had taken from the brow of the monarch," and the Bill of
Rights stands today "as a great dike against the inundation of unlimited democracy;" but, as the authors say, "it cannot be questioned that with the changed
'ethos' of the people, these limitations are gradually losing their strength."
"The balance wheel of the Union," the Supreme Court of the United States, is
one of the three departments of government. The Supreme Court of the United
States on May 27, 1935, rendered three decisions, one invalidating the Industrial
Recovery Act, another holding unconstitutional the so-called Frazier-Lemke Bankruptcy Act; the third limiting the presidential power of removal. On less than
seventy previous occasions had it rendered opinions invalidating laws passed by
Congress and approved by the President. Many of these involved questions of
slight importance or public interest, free from the atmosphere of political controversy
and of little practical importance. Consequently, the authors declare, that May 27,
1935, may be compared to that momentous day in 1857 when the Court handed
down its decision in the Dred Scott case. They say:
"It is a most encouraging fact that not only did these decisions fail
to create the bitter resentment which followed the Dred Scott decision, and
later the decision in the Income Tax Cases, but that the people bowed
without protest to the judgment of the Court. The public reaction to them
is the most encouraging manifestation in recent years of the citizen's sense
of political responsibility.4
"Many thoughtful Americans had begun to doubt whether the American people had a sufficient sense of constitutional morality to insure the
perpetuity of the Constitution."5
The authors probably would at this date make the same statement, because they
are referring to the "people," whose "ethos" seems still to be made up of a will to
preserve our form of government. If this be true, then the Supreme Court, which
has "neither purse nor sword" to influence adherence to its decisions, still stands

3. P. 82.
4. P. 98.
5. P. 99.
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in the minds of the people as the enduring bulwark against invasions of the Constitution. But this cannot be assumed. It must be a fact and it must be affirmatively known. As is stated by the authors in the closing paragraph: 6
"What is needed is an intelligent appraisal of the State of the Union,
a spirit aroused to the active support of our institutions, the citizen awakened to the realities that he alone is the custodian of his own destiny,
and that this responsibility has not been, and cannot be, delegated to his
political agents. This responsibility is indeed great. If he fails, the American
tradition of ordered liberty under law, the culmination of man's greatest
effort to be a free spirit, will, in very truth, be homeless; it will be a tradition without a country. New life and meaning must be given to the
admonition that eternal vigilance still remains the price of liberty."
All thoughtful citizens and those who desire to become citizens should read
and re-read this volume, and understand and ponder the great truths so briefly
and yet so eloquently set forth therein. It should be required reading in every
course on government in every school in the United States.
Kansas City, Missouri
YOUR WILL AND WHAT NOT TO Do ABOUT IT.
SIMON & SCHUSTER, 1937. pp. xxi, 215.

JOHN

By

RENE

A.

F.

RHODES

WORMSER. NEW

YORK:

Here is a book which lawyers will find interesting and perhaps profitable as well.
While written for laymen the attorney will find suggestions for the perfection of his
craft, though with some of the ideas there may be individual disagreement. At any
rate it is well to realize what one's clients may be reading, just as the man who has
already too many friends should peruse How to Make Friends and Influence People
so that he may protect himself against book-learned wiles and synthetic affability.
A few section headings will indicate the scope and tone of the volume: Come Clean
With Your Attorney, Put It All in Your Will, How to Save Guardianship of Property, When You Get Married, Your Residuary Estate, Are You Charitably Inclined,
That Awful Rule Against Perpetuities (The Lawyer's Nightmare), What Taxes Will
Your Estate Have to Pay, Investments in an Estate. The lightness of style is enhanced by slightly Thurberish drawings, many of them illustrating the plight of
persons whose relatives failed to leave well-considered wills.
Mr. Wormser is a member of the New York Bar and he treats the problems
chiefly in the light of the law of that state. There are proper caveats that the
rules may be different in other jurisdictions. Lawyers need not be concerned that
the book will rob them of professional business. The author insists that an attorney
should be employed both as counsellor and as draftsman of the will. The only
specimen will covers twenty-two pages and is designed for a special situation of a
man of considerable means. The legal and extra-legal devices which may obviate
the necessity of a will and administration are soft-pedaled. Short wills are dis-

6. P. 205.
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couraged and the prospective testator is urged to make a rather complicated settlement of his property. Perhaps something may be said for this in the case of a person of wealth. The reviewer's only real criticism is that little attention is given to the
matter of the small estate. For example, there is no suggestion of the advisability
of the man with minor children leaving everything to his trusted and capable
spouse (if such she be) in order that the restrictions of guardianship may not
hamper the family's economic readjustment upon death of the bread-winner.
Possibly the author did not have in mind such small fry. But even one of the
latter will have easy fun reading this book and planning for the disposition of his
property if and when his ship comes in.
University of Missouri Law School
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By CHARLES
PRENTICE HALL, INC., 1937. pp. xii, 742.

THOMAS E. ATKINSON

W.

GERSTENBERG.

NEw

YORK:

This is a serious attempt by the author and his publisher to produce as a classroom tool a book combining the virtues of both a text and a casebook on Constitutional Law, and to do this in compass sufficiently brief to meet the needs of the law
student whose daylight hours are mainly occupied with other employment. Obviously this is a difficult task, but the attempt has more nearly succeeded than
any other to which this writer's attention has been called.
The book is really two books in one, a textbook and a casebook. Of its 717
pages (exclusive of an appendix containing the constitution, and of a brief table
of cases), 277 pages are devoted to a pretty accurate, though necessarily brief and
summary, treatise on constitutional law, while the remaining 437 pages are given
over to selected cases.
The textbook material is surprisingly good. Its brevity is partially compensated
by the great mass of footnote material in smaller type, constituting on an average
about one-half of each page. In this respect, Part I, containing the textbook material,
is in striking contrast to Part II, containing the selected cases. Here note material
is almost entirely wanting, and the student is left to discover related cases and
historical background by reference to the author's treatment in Part I.
It is obvious that in a four-hundred-page casebook on so enormous a subject
as constitutional law many whole topics had to be omitted and others treated with
extreme brevity. For example, there is no chapter on the drafting and adopting of
constitutions, state or national, and Chapter I, "Amendment of the Constitution,"
consists of but a single case ( United States v. Sprague) and occupies but four pages
of the casebook. Chapter II, "States and Territories," covering nine pages, embraces
only two cases, Coyle v. Smith and Balzac v. People of Porto Rico.
In general, good judgment seems to have been used in the selection of cases.
However, one is left to wonder how the student is to get any adequate idea of the
extent to which the Interstate Commerce Commission may now control intrastate
rates by reading the three-page extract from the Shreveport case given on pages
448-451 or footnote 38 on page 123 of the text. While the Transportation Act of
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1920 is mentioned and the C. B. & Q. case cited, the statute is not cited nor is the
substance of the case sufficiently set out to enable the student to grasp its real significance.
A fairly satisfactory table of contents is given, but there is no index, and the
table of cases does not embrace the cases summarized in the text, the footnotes, or
in other cases.
On the whole, the reviewer believes that it is the best work that he has seen
for a brief course in Constitutional Law, where the class is largely composed of students who have little time for preparation and library study. Its defects are mainly
those arising from its brevity, which in turn is an unavoidable concomitant of the
part-time law school.
Southern Methodist University Law School
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